The Kurtz Papers
JOURNAL OF SE ASIAN AFFAIRS, Vol III, March 7th 1965.
Low Intensity Warfare and Use of Special Forces by Col Walter E. Kurtz
...If we admit to the fact that this armed conflict drains on our resources to sustain an effort whose results are disproportionate to our present....engagement...we can find fault either in the...strategy ?... as a whole or down to the commitment of the single orderly.
One of the main advantages of low intensity warfare is that it can be sustained over a long period......and reverses the situation in that it becomes a drain on the enemy's own resources.
Many and many circumstances allow us to stretch the enemy's resources thin... disorganize them, confuse their ranks, turn them against one another, etc, etc.
In order to match such an approach the enemy has no other choice but to adopt a similar one, but one finds out that is very few often the case...... in fact what happens in most instances is a greater concentration of force by the opponent as they fall back on strongholds that they defend at costly losses.
That happens to be very much our situation in Vietnam. It is senseless to defend cities and bases, we should to the contrary adopt the same attitude as the NVA, who is need I stress the point, adopting a low intensity warfare strategy against us......
The use of infiltrated special forces allows us to do more with less; Highly autonomous and trained for survival in difficult conditions, they are the ideal tool to match the NVA guerrilla troops on their own terrain.
The Air Force role should be to support the attacks of these units, protect them or extract them when necessary. We need not have air bases on land to service our effort, as they would again constitute assets that have both the disadvantages of being vulnerable to attacks and monopolize huge resources to protect them.
Instead by using existing naval assets stationed at a safe distance from enemy fire we would remain invulnerable as long as the NVA does not dispose of a consequent naval force. And we would be bent on making sure that it never happens.
The whole operation has to be flexible and highly mobile along Vietnam's long coastal area in order to be the most effective. What we can thus achieve is highly more desirable than what our current landlocked...strategy...can accomplish, if anything.
In the end, should we fail to reverse our strategy completely and reorient our efforts towards sustaining a low intensity war against the NVA with the major role supported by the Navy and not the Army...... and continue committing so much personnel on the ground when we could operate safely by sea....., my assessment is that we will inevitably lose this war in the direst manner... By a slow and inexorable drain on our resources, personnel and morale......
In time our commitment for this "strategical option" will dwindle to next to nothing...Whereas lest we forget theirs in a national cause......
